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TRUSTS AND ESTATES-SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS AND THE "HAPPENSTANCE
OF BANKRUPTCY" RULE
I. INTRODUCTION
This comment argues that section 541(c)(2) of the bankruptcy code,'
which excludes a debtor's interest in a valid spendthrift trust from his or her
bankruptcy estate,2 violates the "happenstance of bankruptcy" rule. That
judicially-created rule provides, in pertinent part:
Property interests are created and defined by state law. Unless some fed-
eral interest requires a different result, there is no reason why such inter-
ests should be analyzed differently simply because an interested party is
involved in a bankruptcy proceeding. Uniform treatment of property in-
terests by both state and federal courts within a State serves to reduce
uncertainty, to discourage forum shopping, and to prevent a party from
receiving 'a windfall merely by reason of the happenstance of bankrupt-
cy.
If section 541(c)(2) applied only to ERISA-qualified retirement trusts,
the rule would be in accord with the "happenstance" doctrine, because re-
tirement income is not only nontransferable while held in trust, but is also
exempt from legal process once paid out to retirees. But, under current law,
section 541(c)(2) also applies to many types of donative trusts. Income from
these trusts, however, is not exempt from legal process once paid out to
beneficiaries. Furthermore, in the case of mandatory or support trusts, credi-
tors may sometimes reach the beneficiary's interest while in the hands of
the trustee--even if it is governed by an enforceable spendthrift clause.
Thus, in most donative contexts, property interests that would be available
to creditors under state law are forever immunized by section 541(c)(2).
Stated another way, because of section 541(c)(2)'s overbroad reach, these
interests are "analyzed differently simply because an interested party is in-
volved in a bankruptcy proceeding," "uniform treatment of property inter-
ests" is frustrated, and the debtor-beneficiary receives "a windfall merely
by reason of the happenstance of bankruptcy."A
1. 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) (2006).
2. See Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753, 758 (1992) ("The natural reading of the
provision entitles a debtor to exclude from property of the estate any interest in a plan or trust
that contains a transfer restriction enforceable under any relevant nonbankruptcy law."); In re
Reagan, No. 09-CV-6075, slip op. at 11, 2010 WL 1533134, at *2 (W.D. Ark. Apr. 15, 2010)
("[T]he bankruptcy court properly determined that prospectively earned income from a
spendthrift trust is not property of the bankruptcy estate.").
3. Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1978) (quoting Lewis v. Mfrs. Nat'l Bank
of Detroit, 364 U.S. 603, 609 (1961)).
4. Patterson, 504 U.S. at 764.
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At the outset, consider the following three scenarios:5
One day, a freak soda-pop accident kills Tony, leaving behind his wife,
Maria, and son, Riff, Jr. Prior to his death, Tony met with his attorney, Glad
Hand, and drafted a last will and testament. In the will, attorney Hand
created a trust whereby all of Tony's property would be transferred in trust
to Doc, for the benefit of Maria and Riff, Jr. Under the terms of the testa-
mentary trust, Doc may pay to Maria, or apply on her behalf, any amount of
income from the dividends from Tony's former business, Cool Industries,
that he-in his absolute discretion--deems necessary for her support and
maintenance during her life, with the stock, itself, going to Riff, Jr. upon her
death. The will contains a valid and enforceable spendthrift provision that
governs all interests created therein, including the trust. Ten years later,
Maria gets involved in an unfortunate Ponzi scheme set up by Mr. Krupke
and, as a result, incurs substantial debt. Crippled with bills she cannot pay,
Maria files for bankruptcy protection.
Another day, a terrible argument over daiquiri recipes convinces
Claude and Doris Upson that they have irreconcilable differences. The two
promptly retain matrimonial lawyers and begin a bitter and protracted di-
vorce. Out of the negotiations, a property settlement is reached whereby,
among other concessions, Claude transfers his impressive bond portfolio to
Mr. Babcock in trust, for the benefit of Doris and their daughter, Gloria.
Under the terms of the trust, Mr. Babcock is required to pay all interest gen-
erated from the bonds to Doris, no less frequently than four times per year.
The trust document contains a valid spendthrift clause. Shortly after the
divorce, Doris is sued for making ugly anti-Semitic remarks and loses a
substantial defamation verdict. 6 Seeking protection from her financial liabil-
ities, Doris files a bankruptcy petition.
Finally, the wealthy Mrs. Eynsford-Hill worries over her derelict son,
Freddy. Knowing that she is approaching her last years, she creates an irre-
vocable spendthrift trust whereby her trustee, Colonel Pickering, is to pay
the net income from the family fortune, as may seem advisable to him, for
the comfortable support and maintenance of Freddy, with the remainder
passing to her beloved Ascot Equestrian Club upon Freddy's death. Later,
Freddy accumulates substantial debt and is forced to file for bankruptcy
protection.
5. The following test-suites were loosely inspired by the great American musical films
WEST SIDE STORY (MGM 1961), AUNTIE MAME (Warner Bros. Pictures 1958), and MY FAIR
LADY (Warner Bros. Pictures 1964), respectively.
6. For purposes of this example, assume that Doris's conduct satisfied the state-law
elements of defamation, but not the "willful and malicious injury" standard of section
523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code making the judgment dischargeable in bankruptcy. See,
e.g., In re Maxey, 395 B.R. 665, 673 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2008). See also infra Part IV.B
(discussing dischargeability in general).
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What should happen to Maria's, Doris's, and Freddy's income interest
in their respective bankruptcy cases? What rights did their respective credi-
tors have prior to the commencement of their bankruptcy cases? Does sec-
tion 541(c)(2) transform these rights? If so, is there a "federal interest that
requires a different result?"7 This comment seeks to answer these questions.
It begins with a brief discussion of spendthrift clauses in donative trusts and
anti-alienation provisions in retirement plans.8 Next, the comment describes
the mechanics of income distribution in both contexts and the processes by
which a beneficiary's creditors can satisfy their claims with those distribu-
tions.9 It then discusses how a beneficiary's filing of a bankruptcy petition
affects and potentially transforms the status of income distributions from a
spendthrift trust.'0 With this frame of reference, the comment returns to the
opening hypotheticals to demonstrate the sometimes inequitable operation
of section 541(c)(2)." The comment concludes by proposing that Congress
modify section 541(c)(2) to bring it into accord with the "happenstance of
bankruptcy" rule: Only interests in retirement or discretionary support trusts
governed by valid spendthrift provisions should be excluded from the deb-
tor's bankruptcy estate.12
II. SPENDTHRIFT CLAUSES AND ANTI-ALIENATION PROVISIONS
A trust is a conveyance whereby one person, known as the settlor, di-
vides certain property into a legal interest and equitable interest such that
the former will be held by a second person or entity, known as the trustee,
for the benefit of a third person, known as the beneficiary. 3 Although trusts
7. The happenstance doctrine contains an exception for certain "federal interests." See
supra text accompanying note 3. For these purposes, a "federal interest" means an "interest
in protecting federal finds and in securing federal investments." Gerald F. Munitz, The
Bankruptcy Power and Structure of the Bankruptcy Code, in PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE,
NUTS AND BOLTS OF CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY 105, 109-10 (2009) (citing United States v.
Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 740 (1979)). Therefore, the short answer to the question
posed is "no."
8. See infra Part II.
9. See infra Part III.
10. See infra Part IV.
11. See infra Part V.
12. See infra Part VI.
13. Lynn Foster, The Arkansas Trust Code: Good Law for Arkansas, 27 U. ARK. LITTLE
ROCK L. REV. 191, 191 (2005). Professor Foster has elegantly described this severing of
property rights as "split[ting] the bundle of sticks" into "responsibility and enjoyment." Id.
The trustee, who obtains legal title, is burdened with the "responsibility," while the benefi-
ciary, who obtains equitable title, actually "enjoys" the property. A valid trust is comprised
of five elements. See RAYMOND C. O'BRIEN & MICHAEL T. FLANNERY, DECEDENTS'
ESTATES: CASES AND MATERIALS 460-504 (2006). (1) It must be created by a settlor who, (2)
with the requisite capacity and intent, see ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-73-402(a)(1), (2) (LEXIS
Repl. 2004), (3) contributes ascertainable property to the trust, see id. § 28-73-103(13);
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may be categorized in many ways,14 this comment focuses on two specific
kinds-donative trusts and retirement trusts. The former are often used as
will substitutes to provide a legacy to a decedent's friends or family,' 5 while
the latter allow a person to transform modest amounts of present income
into substantial future income streams.16 Because both donative and retire-
ment trusts provide income for maintenance and support, it is not surprising
that both often employ spendthrift provisions to prevent beneficiaries from
transferring their interests and to prevent their creditors from reaching those
interests in satisfaction of debt." A spendthrift provision is a clause that,
when inserted into a trust document, "prohibits the beneficiary's interest
from being assigned" and "prevents a creditor from attaching that inter-
est."' 8 Such a clause is presumptively valid so long as it restrains both vo-
Speelman v. Pascal, 178 N.E.2d 723 (N.Y. 1961) (holding a letter transferring the right to
certain royalties from a yet-to-be-made film version of a musical was a valid assignment of
property rights under New York law), (4) for the benefit of one or more definite beneficia-
ries, see ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-73-402(a)(3), (5) to be held by a trustee who shall "adminis-
ter the trust in good faith, in accordance with its terms and purposes and the interests of the
beneficiaries." Id. § 28-73-801.
14. First, trusts may be either express or implied. GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT, THE LAW
OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 1 (1951). Express trusts may be further subdivided into private,
charitable, or honorary trusts. O'BRIEN & FLANNERY, supra note 13, at 504. Implied trusts
arise through operation of law in one of two circumstances: (1) because a settlor's express
trust fails for some reason-creating a resulting trust; or (2) to prevent a person from profit-
ing by his own wrongdoing-creating a constructive trust. Id. at 519. Second, classification
may also be based on the status of the settlor at the time of creation of the trust. If the settlor
executes a trust while alive, the trust is said to be "inter vivos." Id. at 461. If, however, the
trust is created by will at the settlor's death, it will be considered a testamentary trust. Id.
Third, it is important to distinguish between revocable and irrevocable trusts. The former
may be revoked or amended by the settlor at any time. ARK. CODE. ANN. § 28-73-602
(LEXIS Repl. 2004). Under the Uniform Trust Code, adopted by twenty-three states, includ-
ing Arkansas, see National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,
Uniform Trust Code, http://www.nccusl.org/Update/uniformactfactsheets/uniformacts-fs-
utc2000trusts.asp (last visited Oct. 15, 2009), trusts are presumed to be revocable unless the
terms expressly state otherwise. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-73-602. Irrevocable trusts are usually
employed with tax planning in mind, as they can reduce both income and transfer taxes. See
WILLIAM M. MCGOVERN, JR. & SHELDON F. KURTZ, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES § 5.5 (3d
ed. 2004).
15. See ROBERT J. LYNN, AN INTRODUCTION TO ESTATE PLANNING 129 (1975); O'BRIEN
& FLANNERY, supra note 13, at 461.
16. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A) (2006).
17. Spendthrift wills and trusts are an American invention that likely emanated from
Pennsylvania during the nineteenth century. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1552 (8th ed. 2004).
One early case from that state referred to a "spendthrift son trust," possibly indicating that
the beneficiary did not inherit his father's Quaker virtues of prudence and frugality. Thackara
v. Mintzer, 100 Pa. 151 (1882).
18. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1552 (8th ed. 2004). See also In re Schwartz, 58 B.R.
606 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1984) ("Spendthrift trusts are trusts created to maintain a designated
beneficiary and to insulate the fund from claims of the beneficiary's creditors.").
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luntary and involuntary transfers of the beneficiary's interest.19 This section
compares the classic, donative spendthrift trust with similar anti-alienation
provisions commonly found in retirement plans and focuses upon the me-
chanics by which a creditor can access income distributions in each situa-
tion.
A. Spendthrift Trusts, Creditors, and the Importance of Timing
To begin, a spendthrift clause only protects the beneficiary's interest
while in the hands of the trustee-not once it is actually distributed to the
beneficiary.20 Thus, timing is a central issue. If the trust's spendthrift provi-
sion is valid,2' the beneficiary's creditor will probably have to wait for a
distribution before commencing judicial collection activity. There is ample
authority, however, that suggests that the terms of the trust might permit
collection sooner.22 This subsection will review the process by which a
creditor can pursue an income beneficiary under a spendthrift trust. The first
step is to reduce a debt to judgment. As discussed below, the laws of execu-
tion vary by jurisdiction; this comment will proceed under Arkansas law.
1. Obtaining a Judgment Lien
In some states, the prevailing party in a debt action obtains a judgment
lien automatically. 23 In Arkansas, however, a creditor must first seek a writ
of execution from the sheriff of a county in which the debtor has property.24
This writ authorizes seizure and appropriation of the debtor's property in
19. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-73-102 (LEXIS Supp. 2004); see also Bowlin v. Citizens'
Bank & Trust Co., 131 Ark. 97, 198 S.W. 288 (1917).
20. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 152 cmt. j (1957); BOGERT, supra note 14,
at § 222 ("The income from the trust when paid to the beneficiary can be taken by his credi-
tors, as can any realty or personalty [bought] with that income."); see also Comm'r v. Porter,
148 F.2d 566, 568-69 (5th Cir. 1945) ("As long as the income was in the hands of the trus-
tees and undistributed it was protected, but as soon as it was paid over, it passed to the
daughters as their property, freely and completely alienable, and as fully subject as any other
unrestricted property of theirs to the ordinary impact of the law."); Erwin N. Griswold,
Reaching the Interest of the Beneficiary of a Spendthrift Trust, 43 HARv. L. REV. 63, 84
(1929) ("When the income has been paid into the hands of the beneficiary, it becomes the
property of the beneficiary without being subject to any restraints, and may be alienated by
him, and likewise may be reached by his creditors.").
21. See infra Part II.B.
22. See infra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
23. DAVID G. EPSTEIN, BANKRUPTCY AND RELATED LAW IN A NUTSHELL 40 (7th ed.
2005). This right is usually granted by statute. Id.
24. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-66-112 (LEXIS Repl. 2005). See McGehee Bank v. Greeson,
223 Ark. 18, 19-20, 263 S.W.2d 901, 902 (1954). The process is the same for judgments
arising out of cases originally tried in federal court. FED. R. Civ. P. 69(a)(1).
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satisfaction of the judgment against him.2 5 Chapter 66 of Title 16 of the
Arkansas Code sets forth the specific laws of execution in Arkansas. 26 Some
important rules therein include a ten-day waiting period,27 the plaintiffs
right to interest and costs,28 important due-process requirements, 2 9 and the
availability of "alias executions."30
2. Exemptions from Execution
Article 9 of the Arkansas Constitution addresses exemption from ex-
ecution. Its ten sections provide umbrella principles to guide the legislature
in codifying specific laws on the execution upon judgments and have fre-
quently been invoked to invalidate exemption statutes repugnant to them.31
Article 9 neither discusses nor alludes to gifts of income, anti-alienation
provisions, or any analogous interest. Arkansas's rule on exemptions from
execution is clear: All real and personal property of a defendant under an
execution upon any judgment may be sold to satisfy the execution, unless it
is specifically exempt.32 The Arkansas Code subchapter governing property
subject to execution does not specifically exempt a beneficiary's interest in
the net income from a donative trust-even one with a valid spendthrift
provision. 33 In summation-outside of bankruptcy-a spendthrift provision
will not protect trust income once it has been paid to a beneficiary. Those
creditors holding judgment liens can execute upon such income the moment
it is paid by the trustee.
25. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-66-201 (LEXIS Repl. 2005).
26. Id. §§ 16-66-101 to -119.
27. ARK. R. Civ. P. 62(a) ("Except as otherwise ordered by the court, no execution or
enforcement proceedings shall issue on any judgment or decree until after the expiration of
ten (10) days from the entry thereof").
28. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-66-101 (LEXIS Repl. 2005).
29. Duhon v. Gravett, 302 Ark. 358, 790 S.W.2d 155 (1990) ("[Notice need only in-
form the debtor that postjudgment execution is being levied and that state and federal exemp-
tions may be available with respect to the property subject to the levy."). Id. at 362, 790
S.W.2d at 157.
30. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-66-113 (LEXIS Repl. 2005).
31. See, e.g., In re Williams, 93 B.R. 181 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1988) (invalidating statute
exempting certain insurance proceeds from execution as violative of article IX, section 2 of
the Arkansas Constitution).
32. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-66-201 (LEXIS Repl. 2005); Keith v. Drainage Dist. No.
7, 183 Ark. 786, 38 S.W.2d 755 (1931).
33. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-66-201 et seq.
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B. Circumstances Under Which a Spendthrift Provision in a Donative
Trust May Be Invalid
In certain situations, creditors may be able to access the beneficiary's
interest even while it is in the hands of the trustee because the spendthrift
clause governing it is unenforceable. Spendthrift provisions may be unen-
forceable either intrinsically-because a given interest does not qualify for
protection against alienation, such as "self-settled trusts," or extrinsically-
because public policy places the rights of certain creditors above those of
the settlor, such as family support creditors. As will be discussed later in
this comment, a spendthrift clause's validity under state law is profoundly
significant because section 541(c)(2) will only exclude a debtor's interest in
such a trust from the bankruptcy estate if the provision is "enforceable un-
der applicable nonbankruptcy law." 34 In other words, the "applicable non-
bankruptcy law" set forth in the following sections determines whether a
particular spendthrift trust is valid and therefore eligible for the protections
provided by section 541 (c)(2).
1. The Intrinsic Exceptions to Validity
Spendthrift provisions are merely restraints on alienation. Although
American courts have almost uniformly embraced them as a means to allow
the settlor to protect the interests of his or her beneficiaries long after his or
her passing,35 there are several logical constraints to the application of such
a restraint. In this section, these inherent limitations of spendthrift provi-
sions will be discussed.
a. Self-settled trusts
First, a spendthrift provision may not protect the settlor's own benefi-
cial interest in a trust.36 This is a venerable exception and is recognized in
all jurisdictions.37 Importantly, the rule is not that a settlor may not name
himself a beneficiary of a trust,38 but rather that he may not use a spendthrift
provision as a sword to thwart his own creditors. An extension of this prin-
ciple is that a spendthrift provision cannot govern a beneficiary's interest
34. See discussion infra Part IVC.
35. See BOGERT, supra note 14, at § 222.
36. See In re Hartman, 115 B.R. 171 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1990) (noting that spendthrift
trusts cannot be "self-settled" under Arkansas law).
37. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 156 (1957); In re Schwartz, 58 B.R. 606
(Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1984); Pac. Nat'1 Bank v. Windram, 133 Mass. 175, 176-77 (1882).
38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 114 (1957).
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where the beneficiary possesses a substantial degree of control over the
trust.39
b. Terminated trusts
The second intrinsic exception to the validity of spendthrift trusts oc-
curs after a trust is terminated for some reason. The rule here is that the pro-
vision is not enforceable independently of the trust. Where a trust is termi-
nated by mutual agreement of the beneficiaries, it can remain active for a
period of time so that the trustee may finalize and wind down all trust af-
fairs.40 The spendthrift provision remains enforceable against the creditors
of any beneficiary during this period as well, but becomes void after the
trust officially ends.4 1
c. Spendthrift provision only applicable to a particular interest
The last intrinsic exception is when the spendthrift provision speaks
only to a particular interest under the trust. For example, where a spendthrift
provision was expressly applicable only to a life estate, a court held that
creditors of the remaindermen were not barred by it.42 Also, if a spendthrift
provision concerns only payments made for the maintenance or support of a
particular beneficiary, it will not apply to payments made for purposes
above and beyond that support.43
2. The Extrinsic Exceptions to Validity
The following exceptions exist not because a spendthrift provision is
inherently incapable of enforcement, but because particular creditors of the
beneficiary-as a matter of public policy-possess certain privileged
claims."
a. Family support creditors
A person holding a claim for spousal or child support against a benefi-
ciary may reach that person's interest even though it is protected by a valid
39. In re Swanson, 873 F.2d 1121 (8th Cir. 1989).
40. See In re Trust Created Under Agreement with McLaughlin, 361 N.W.2d 43 (Minn.
1985).
41. See id.
42. Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Paris, 447 N.E.2d 1268 (Mass. 1983).
43. See, e.g., Levey v. First Va. Bank, 845 F.2d 80 (4th Cir. 1988).
44. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 157 (1957).
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spendthrift provision.45 To pierce the spendthrift provision, however, the
claim must not arise out of a property settlement. Both alimony and child
support obligations usually qualify for the privilege.4 7 Under Arkansas law,
the seminal case is Council v. Owens.4 8 In that case, the Arkansas Court of
Appeals held that "the legal obligation for support, regardless of whether it
is for alimony or child support, is more compelling and outweighs the intent
of the settlor to shelter the beneficiary's interest in the trust."49
b. Government creditors
A spendthrift provision will not shield a beneficiary against tax liens
by a government entity.50 This is true, even if the provision expressly pro-
vides that trust assets may not be used to pay government claims.5 Fur-
thermore, even when state law provides an exemption from execution,52 the
federal government may reach a beneficiary's interest in a spendthrift
trust.53
c. Custodians and providers of necessities to beneficiaries
Persons who provide a beneficiary with necessities such as food, cloth-
ing, medical care, and other similar custodial items may seek reimburse-
ment from the trust despite a spendthrift provision.54 Notably, however, if
the trustee stands willing and ready to furnish these necessities, a third per-
son may not interpose himself as a Good Samaritan and pierce the spend-
thrift provision.5 To the contrary, one court has held that a person must
show that the trustee wrongly withheld such support in violation of the
terms of the trust before the third party may recover against the trust.56
45. See, e.g., Posner v. Sheridan, 299 A.2d 309 (Pa. 1973); see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 59(a) (2003).
46. See, e.g., In re Goelet's Will, 28 A.D.2d 149 (N.Y. App. Div. 1967).
47. See, e.g., Hurley v. Hurley, 309 N.W.2d 225 (Mich. 1981). But cf Garretson v.
Garretson, 306 A.2d 737 (Del. 1973) (denying privilege to alimony claimant).
48. 28 Ark. App. 49, 770 S.W.2d 193 (1989).
49. Id. at 55, 770 S.W.2d at 197.
50. See, e.g., First N.W. Trust Co. v. Comm'r, 622 F.2d 387 (8th Cir. 1980);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 157 cmt. e (1957).
51. United States v. Taylor, 254 F. Supp. 752 (N.D. Cal. 1966).
52. See discussion supra Part II.A.2.
53. First N. W Trust, 622 F.2d at 390; see also Leuschner v. First W. Bank and Trust
Co., 261 F.2d 705, 707 (9th Cir. 1958); United States v. Dallas Nat'l Bank, 152 F.2d 582,
585 (5th Cir. 1945).
54. See, e.g., Erickson v. Bank of Cal., NA, 643 P.2d 670 (Wash. 1982).
55. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 157 cmt. c (1957).
56. In re Estate of Dodge, 281 N.W.2d 447 (Iowa 1979).
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d. Preservers of the trust
When a person has protected trust assets against loss or protected a
particular beneficiary's interest thereunder, a spendthrift provision will not
operate to deprive him or her of compensation. The Restatement frames the
issue in terms of unjust enrichment: It would be perverse to permit the estate
to employ persons to preserve and protect the trust's corpus and then allow
57
the estate to repudiate its lawful obligation to remunerate those persons.
But once again-no matter how helpful-the intervention may not be
forced upon the trustee or beneficiary.18 Some courts have termed this sort
of unrequested intervention in the affairs of a trust as "officious intermed-
dling."5 9
C. Anti-Alienation Provisions in Retirement Trusts as Spendthrift Provi-
sions
Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA), all retirement plans must "provide that benefits provided under
the plan may not be assigned or alienated."6 0 The accompanying federal
regulations also require that such benefits "may not be anticipated, assigned
(either at law or in equity), alienated or subject to attachment, garnishment,
levy, execution or other legal or equitable process." 61 This protection is so
potent that it cannot be pierced by the United States Government even in
cases of civil and criminal forfeiture.62 It is so far-reaching that it even pro-
vides a retirement plan's trustee with a statutory cause of action with which
he may enforce the prohibition on assignment or alienation of pension bene-
57. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 157 cmt. d (1957).
58. Id.
59. See, e.g., In re Gannon, 631 A.2d 176, 183 (Pa. Super. 1993).
60. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (2006).
61. 26 C.F.R. § 1.401(a)-13(b). Whether ERISA protects benefits once they are paid out
to beneficiaries is not entirely clear. Generally, courts focusing on statutory interpretation
have held that they are not, see, e.g., Hoult v. Hoult, 373 F.3d 47, 54-56 (1st Cir. 2004)
(comparing ERISA, which is silent on protection of benefits post-receipt, with the Veterans
Benefit Act, which expressly prohibits attachment before and after receipt by beneficiary),
while those focusing on the practical function of the statute and public policy have held they
are. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 47 F.3d 681, 683 (4th Cir. 1995) ("Where ... funds are
paid pursuant to the terms of the plan as income during retirement years, ERISA prohibits
their alienation."). Should the Supreme Court resolve this circuit split in favor of the first
view, most retirement benefits will likely remain invulnerable to creditors vis- -vis the state
exemptions from execution discussed infra at note 64.
62. See Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat'l Pension Fund, 493 U.S. 365, 376 (1990)
(stating that ERISA's anti-alienation provision reflects "a considered congressional policy
choice ... to safeguard a stream of income for pensioners (and their dependents . . ) even if
that decision prevents others from securing relief for the wrongs done them.").
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fits. 6 3 Additionally, every state in our union-save for Alabama-statutorily
exempts most retirement benefits from execution. 4 Thus, even once paid
out, these funds are unavailable to a beneficiary's creditors.
The obvious public policy supporting the exemption of pension or re-
tirement benefits from legal process is to give effect to the essential purpose
of such a plan-to provide income in old age for retired employees and,
thereby, to prevent them from becoming a burden on society. But again, the
restraint on alienation in ERISA-qualified retirement plans operates as an
exemption from execution because of its potent anti-alienation provision, 65
the federal common law interpreting it,66 and the state exemption laws listed
61
ante. Put simply, no creditor can attach, levy, or seize the retiree's interest,
whether it lies in the hands of the benefit plan administrator or in those of
the retiree. This result is quite different from the restraint on alienation in
donative spendthrift trusts, which protects the interest only while in the
hands of the trustee.
63. United States v. All Funds ex rel. Weiss, 345 F.3d 49, 56-57 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding
that pension plan accounts cannot be assigned or alienated even in the case of malfeasance or
criminal misconduct).
64. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.38.017 (1998); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1126 (2005);
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-66-220 (LEXIS Repl. 2005); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 704.115 (2009);
CoLo. REV. STAT. § 13-54-102(s) (2005); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-321a (2007); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 10, § 4915 (2007); FLA. STAT. § 222.21 (2007); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 18-4-20, -22
(1997); HAW. REV. STAT. § 651-124 (2005); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 11-604A (2004); 735 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-1006 (1991); IND. CODE § 34-55-10-2(c)(6) (2008); IOWA CODE
§ 627.6 (2007); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-2308 (2002); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 427.005(1),
.010(2) (West 1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20:33 (2004); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §
4422(13)(E) (2007); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 11-504 (h)(1) (West 2007); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ch. 235, § 34A (2000); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.6023(k) (2000); MINN. STAT. §
550.37 (2010); Miss. CODE ANN. § 85-3-1 (2008); Mo. REV. STAT. § 513.430 (2004); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 25-13-608 (2007); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1563.01 (1999); NEV. REV. STAT. §
21.090 (2009); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 511:2 (1998); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:17-57 (West
2000); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 42-10-1 (West 1983); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5205 (McKinney 2009);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § IC-1601 (2009); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-22-03.1 (2009); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2329.66 (Lexis Nexis 2008); OKLA. STAT. tit. 31, § 1 (2009); OR. REV. STAT. § 18.358
(2003); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8124 (West 2007); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-26-4 (2008); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 15-41-30 (2008); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 43-45-16 (2007); TENN. CODE ANN. §
26-2-105 (2007); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.0021 (Vernon 2005); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-
5-505 (2008); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2740 (16) (2001); VA. CODE ANN. § 34-34 (2007);
WASH. REV. CODE § 6.15.020 (2007); W. VA. CODE § 38-8-1 (2004); Wis. STAT. § 815.18
(2007); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 1-20-110 (1998); see also Marjorie A. Shields, Annotation,
Individual Retirement Accounts As Exempt from Money Judgments in State Courts, 113
A.L.R.5th 487 (2003); Annotation, Employee Retirement Pension Benefits as Exempt from
Garnishment, Attachment, Levy, Execution, or Similar Proceedings, 93 A.L.R.3d 711 (1979).
65. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
66. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
67. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
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III. TRUST INCOME DISTRIBUTION AND CREDITORS' RIGHTS THERETO
Having discussed the general impact of spendthrift provisions in trusts,
this comment now turns to the specifics of trust income distribution and
creditor's remedies. This section will analyze the various modes of distribu-
tion under donative trusts and demonstrate how each provides varying de-
grees of protection from creditors. 68 It will also discuss the mechanics of
retirement plans under ERISA, noting that such plans are actually a unique
species of trust.69
A. Income Distribution Under Donative Trusts
In a typical donative trust, the settlor gives certain assets to the trustee
in trust for the beneficiaries. When the settlor funds the trust, he usually
designates to whom the net income generated by the trust should be paid.
Such an interest is typically created in the form of a life estate and is distinct
from the rights held by those beneficiaries who are entitled to the remainder.
This comment will focus on income beneficiaries and their interest in the
distributions made under the trust.
In the trust document, the settlor must set out the terms on which net
income should be paid.70 As will be shown, the language the drafter em-
ploys is critical in determining the rights of the beneficiary-and those of
his or her creditors. Despite this inherent flexibility, there are three basic
kinds of income distributions that a settlor may select: mandatory distribu-
tions, discretionary distributions, and discretionary support distributions.
1. Mandatory Income Distributions
In many trusts, the settlor instructs the trustee to make regular pay-
ments of the income generated from the trust after payment of taxes and
other administrative expenses to one or more beneficiaries. While the inter-
val between such payments may vary, the trustee's duty to make them is a
constant. The language creating mandatory distributions clearly sets forth
this duty. For example, a settlor may provide, "The trustee shall pay all net
income generated by the preferred stock of MegaCorp at least quarterly to
my wife, Mary." Here, the trustee must pay the net income generated by the
shares of MegaCorp to Mary no less frequently than four times per year. His
68. See infra Part III.A.
69. See infra Part III.B.
70. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-73-103(19) (LEXIS Repl. 2005) (defining "terms of the
trust" to be "the manifestation of the settlor's intent regarding a trust's provisions as ex-
pressed in the trust instrument . . . .").
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duties are mandatory, and any derogation constitutes a breach of fiduciary
duty.7'
In mandatory trusts, the beneficiary has a fully vested interest. The Su-
preme Court of the United States has held that "the gift of income" in a trust
that is "required to be distributed periodically" is a "present [economic]
interest."72 Because the beneficiary of a mandatory income stream is fully
vested in a present economic interest, creditors may "reach the beneficiary's
interest by attachment of present or future distributions to or for the benefit
",73of the beneficiary or other means. Courts have described this process as
allowing a beneficiary's creditor to "stand in the shoes" of the beneficiary
and obtain whatever legal rights he has.74 For example, in McDonald v.
Evatt, the Ohio Supreme Court was presented with the question whether an
income beneficiary had a present economic interest in net income arising
over a term of years and payable anytime before the end of the term, such
that her creditors could compel the income. The court held that although
the trustee had unfettered discretion as to the specific timing of the pay-
ments within the term, the beneficiary was ultimately entitled to the distri-
butions and, therefore, her creditors and assignees were similarly entitled.
2. Discretionary Income Distributions
As their name implies, discretionary distributions may be made at the
discretion of the trustee. The trustee has total and absolute discretion to
make or withhold any and all distributions. In these trusts, the language is
rife with choice and permission: "as the trustee deems appropriate" or "in
the trustee's sole and absolute discretion." Thus, in such a trust, the benefi-
ciary has only an expectancy interest77 and not a present enforceable inter-
est.78 Therefore, under the "stands in the shoes" rule, creditors cannot com-
pel distributions, and beneficiaries cannot validly assign them. 79
71. It should be said that at least one condition precedent exists before the trustee can
make such a distribution: The given asset must actually produce income. Under the above
example, if MegaCorp were to discontinue paying dividends, then the trustee would not be in
violation of his duties for failing to make a distribution.
72. Fondren v. Comm'r, 324 U.S. 18, 21 (1945) (citing Sensenbrenner v. Comm'r, 134
F.2d 883 (7th Cir. 1943)); see also Rollman v. United States, 169 Ct. Cl. 680, 688 (1965)
(stating in dictum that the right of a beneficiary to a mandatory distribution of trust income is
a present economic interest).
73. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-73-501 (LEXIS Repl. 2004).
74. State v. Rubion, 308 S.W.2d 4, 7-8 (Tex. 1957).
75. 62 N.E.2d 164, 167-68 (Ohio 1945).
76. Id.
77. In re Horton, 668 N.W.2d 208, 215 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003).
78. See supra notes 72-74.
79. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-73-504(a) (LEXIS Repl. 2004).
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Because a discretionary trust "vests the trustee with substantial disposi-
tive discretion in the distribution of the trust fund,"80 one might assume that
his actions are not subject to review. This is not necessarily so.81 For exam-
ple, in Medical Park Hospital v. Bancorp South,82 the Arkansas Supreme
Court had to determine what rights a lifetime income beneficiary's creditor
had in distributions that were to be made from the net income of a trust "as
may seem advisable to [the trustee] for the comfortable support and main-
tenance" of the beneficiary.83 The court found that the beneficiary's court-
approved monthly allowance was proper considering the "support and main-
tenance" standard set forth in the trust document,8 4 and it held that the bene-
ficiary had a present enforceable interest in only this amount and only while
he lived.85 Therefore, his creditors could not pierce the trust because their
intervention came too late-after the beneficiary's death.
3. Discretionary Support Trusts
It should be clear that "support and maintenance" trusts are distinct
from purely discretionary trusts. The former can be "governed by an ascer-
tainable standard" while the latter cannot. Distributions premised solely
upon support, however, probably satisfy the "present economic interest"
standard and would likely be available to creditors 87 -So long as the benefi-
ciary is still alive. But if a trust adds a layer of express discretion on top of a
pure support trust, an entirely new kind of distribution scheme arises-one
that combines the essential qualities of both: the discretionary support
trust."
80. Evelyn Ginsberg Abravanel, Discretionary Support Trusts, 68 IOWA L. REV. 273,
277 (1983).
81. See id. at 277-78.
82. 357 Ark. 316, 166 S.W.3d 19 (2004).
83. Id. at 326, 166 S.W.3d at 25.
84. Id. at 329, 166 S.W.3d at 27; see also Abravanel, supra note 80, at 278 n.21 (citing
In re Sullivan, 12 N.W.2d 148, 150-51 (Neb. 1943) (holding that judicial review was proper
because the trustee's failure to provide any support to beneficiaries under a discretionary
trust was arbitrary and capricious)).
85. Med. Park Hosp., 357 Ark. at 328, 166 S.W.3d at 27.
86. Abravanel, supra note 80, at 278. The standard under support trusts is whether the
proposed distribution "enable[s] the beneficiary to maintain his or her accustomed standard
of living." Id. Professor Abravanel found this contention somewhat illogical because such a
standard is inherently imprecise and logically imputes substantial discretion to the trustee. Id.
87. See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
88. Abravanel, supra note 80. Professor Abravanel was the first scholar to coin the term
"discretionary support trust" and describe it as a distinct means of trust administration. Her
article has been invaluable to this author in identifying and classifying the theoretical modes
of income distribution in trusts.
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Discretionary support trusts substitute the trustee's judgment in place
of the objective and ascertainable "necessary support and maintenance"
standard. For example, a trust may provide, "To [my trustee], in trust, to pay
to [the beneficiary] or apply only so much of the income or principal of the
trust, from time to time, as [my trustee shall in his uncontrolled discretion
deem] necessary for the support and maintenance [of the beneficiary] . . ."
during her life, then to my children. 89 Most importantly, this sort of trust
allows the trustee to "apply" income on behalf of the beneficiary instead of
paying it directly to him.90 Because a creditor cannot reach "income" never
received by the beneficiary and the beneficiary has no present enforceable
interest, discretionary support trusts are more difficult for creditors to
pierce; generally, only those creditors possessing a privileged claim for pro-
viding necessities to the beneficiary can compel a distribution.9 1
The case of Strojek v. Hardin County Board of Supervisors is illustra-
tive.92 Strojek concerned a discretionary support trust (governed by a valid
spendthrift provision) that benefitted a mentally disabled woman (Strojek)
who was living free-of-charge at a residential facility run by her local coun-
ty.93 For several years, Strojek's trustee donated $10,000 from the trust to
the county to assist "with the costs of [her] care." 94 Later, however, the
county changed its policy to include residents' financial resources in deter-
mining whether "[they] were eligible for county-sponsored benefits." 95 Be-
cause of Strojek's interest in the trust, the county determined that her "assets
were in excess of the eligibility minimums" and that she "no longer quali-
fied for [financial] assistance." 9 6 Following a series of administrative hear-
ings, Strojek sought judicial review in state court, arguing that her interest
in the trust was unreachable by her creditors.97 Focusing upon the settlor's
intent to provide support for Strojek,9' the court held that the county could
89. Id. at 278.
90. The trustee could presumably pay rents, mortgages, auto loans, insurance premiums,
utility bills, and food and medical expenses, because in his uncontrolled discretion, he feels
that it is necessary for the maintenance and support of the beneficiary.
91. See supra Part II.B.2.c.
92. 602 N.W.2d 566 (Iowa Ct. App. 1999).





98. Strojek, 602 N.W.2d at 568. The trust provided:
My trustee shall, from time to time, pay to or apply for the benefit of my daugh-
ter, Marie Helen Strojek, such sums from the income and principal as my trustee
in the exercise of her sole discretion deems necessary or advisable, to provide




reach assets from the trust, but only those "necessary for Strojek's basic
needs."99
B. Income Distribution Under Retirement Trusts
For most Americans, providing for retirement involves setting aside a
portion of present income and combining that savings with employer con-
tributions and investing that money in securities that will, hopefully, appre-
ciate over time. ERISA governs all such arrangements,100 unless they are
specifically exempt. 0 ' Under ERISA, retirement plans are either defined-
benefit or defined-contribution plans. A defined-benefit plan, as its name
implies, provides a retiree with a fixed amount of retirement income.10 2 In
defined-benefit plans, retiree and employer contributions are placed in a
general pool of assets, as opposed to individual accounts.103 Out of this
pool, fixed periodic payments are made to individual plan beneficiaries,
usually correlated to the individual's ending salary and his or her years of
99. Id. at 571. Notably, the county was entitled to pierce the trust only because it held a
privileged claim as a provider of necessities. Other unprivileged creditors seeking to attach to
the trust assets would likely not have been successful. See supra Part II.B.2.c.
100. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a)(1) (2006) ("[T]his subchapter shall apply to any employee
benefit plan if it is established or maintained ... by any employer engaged in commerce or in
any industry or activity affecting commerce. . . .").
101. Id. § 1003(b) (2006). There are five categories of plans not covered by ERISA: (1)
plans for government employees; (2) plans offered by tax-exempt religious organizations; (3)
plans maintained to comply with workers' compensation unemployment compensation, or
disability insurance laws; (4) plans maintained outside of the United States for the benefit of
nonresidents; and (5) so-called "excess benefit plans" that provide certain fringe benefits in
lieu of monetary compensation for highly remunerated executives. Logically, ERISA does
not apply to retirement investing undertaken by individuals outside the employment context.
See, e.g., Johns v. Rozet, 826 F. Supp. 565 (D.D.C. 1993) (holding that funds rolled over
from employee benefit plan into individual retirement account were not covered by ERISA).
Thus, an individual retirement account (IRA) funded with personal savings and administered
by an account holder would not fall under ERISA. 26 U.S.C. § 408(a) (2006) (setting forth
internal revenue requirements for IRAs). IRAs formed and administered in connection with a
person's employment, however, do fall under ERISA. Such IRAs fall under ERISA by satis-
fying one of four qualifiers: (1) The employer or employee association makes contributions
to the plan; (2) participation in the plan is compulsory; (3) the employer's involvement in the
plan goes beyond merely collecting contributions and remitting them to the administrator; or
(4) the employer or employee association receives any consideration above reasonable com-
pensation for costs incurred in transferring employee contributions. 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-2(d).
Even if an IRA is beyond ERISA's reach, however, it may still be protected by state law
exemptions or by section 522(d)(10)(E) of the Bankruptcy Code. WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR.,
NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 61:17 (3d ed. 2008).
102. See Shepley v. New Coleman Holdings, Inc., 174 F.3d 65, 67 (2d Cir. 1999) ("[A]
defined-benefit plan ... predetermines the level of benefits to which participating employees
will ultimately be entitled.").
103. See Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 439 (1999).
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service, 10 4 commencing at the beneficiary's retirement.10  In defined-
contribution plans, on the other hand, the employee and employer make
regular contributions to an individual account that, alone, bears the risk of
loss and forfeiture and, alone, stands to benefit from gain and income.' 06
Upon retirement, a participant in a defined-contribution plan receives in
periodic payments "whatever level of benefits the amount contributed on his
[or her] behalf will provide."l 07 Most 401(k) plans are defined-contribution
plans. 108
ERISA requires all plan assets to be held in trust for plan beneficia-
ries.109 Hence, it is proper to call these plans "retirement trusts." Plan ad-
ministrators, therefore, are "trustees" and are burdened with fiduciary re-
sponsibilities. Section 404(a) of ERISA sets forth the standard of care the
plan administrator must meet in handling the investment of plan assets.10
To begin, the administrator must "discharge his duties with respect to [the]
plan solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries." I His con-
duct is governed by a "prudent man" standard that is founded upon "care,
skill, ... and diligence." 12 With respect to asset allocation, the administra-
tor must "diversify[] the investments of the plan so as to minimize the risk
of large losses, unless under the circumstances it is clearly prudent not to do
so.""3 This investment rule echoes the doctrine of prudent investing that
applies to trustees in a donative trust context. 1 14
In summary, a retiree under an ERISA plan is a beneficiary in an ana-
logous way to an income beneficiary of a donative trust: Both receive peri-
odic income distributions that are protected by anti-alienation clauses and
are administered by a trustee with serious fiduciary responsibilities. Yet,
because of the fundamental difference between them as to exemption sta-
tus,'115 the interests are fundamentally not the same: The retiree's interest is
104. Parada v. Parada, 999 P.2d 184 (Ariz. 2000).
105. See 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(14) (2006); 29 U.S.C. § 1056(a) (2006).
106. 26 U.S.C. § 414(i) (2006).
107. See, e.g., Hughes Aircraft, 525 U.S. at 439.
108. These plans are named after the Internal Revenue Code section in which they are
described, 26 U.S.C. § 401(k).
109. 29 U.S.C. § 1103 (2006).
110. Id. § 1104(a).
111. Id. § 1104(a)(1).
112. Id.
113. Id § 1104(a)(1)(C).
114. See Estate of Collins, 139 Cal. Rptr. 644, 669-70 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977) (quoting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 227). See generally RAYMOND C. O'BRIEN & MICHAEL
T. FLANNERY, THE PRUDENT INVESTING OF TRUSTS: CASES AND MATERIALS (2009) (discuss-
ing the scope of the trustee's fiduciary responsibilities, the evolving nature of investment
principles, the potential causes of action for an aggrieved settlor or beneficiary, and the many
other aspects of the prudence doctrine).
115. See supra Part II.A.2, II.C.
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truly inalienable, while the donee-beneficiary's is not. The next section of
this comment, however, will show that bankruptcy treats these two interests
as if they were fruit from the same tree.
IV. BANKRUPTCY
The bankruptcy estate casts a wide net to try to catch nearly all of the
debtor's interests in property at the time of filing. Correspondingly, the deb-
tor enjoys immense protection while in bankruptcy. First, all collection ac-
tions against the debtor are automatically stayed regardless of whether they
pertain to property of the estate. 1 6 Second, upon exiting bankruptcy, many,
if not all, debts are discharged."'
This balance of a nearly all-inclusive estate on the one hand, and a po-
tent stay against creditors combined with eventual discharge on the other,
exists to harmonize the interests of all parties in the bankruptcy."' The ba-
sic structure of a successful bankruptcy is that the debtor receives substan-
tial protection of the bankruptcy court, and his creditors receive an equitable
share out of the available funds. It is the most effective way our society has
found to make the best of a bad situation, keeping in mind the disparate
interests involved.
A. An All-Inclusive Estate
The scope of section 541 is broad and brings into the estate all of the
debtor's interests "wherever located and by whomever held."" 9 The effect
of property entering the estate depends somewhat on which kind of relief
the debtor seeks under the bankruptcy code.12 0 In Chapter 7 cases, the bank-
ruptcy trustee collects and sells all estate property and distributes the
proceeds to the debtor's unsecured creditors.121 It is often said that the bank-
ruptcy trustee "stands in the shoes" of the debtor and draws together all of
these interests into the estate.122 In a typical Chapter 11 case, however, the
116. See infra Part IV.A.
117. See infra Part IV.B.
118. See infra Part IV.C.
119. See In re Burgess, 438 F.3d 493, 496 (5th Cir. 2006). The legislative history of §
541 indicates that Congress meant to "bring anything of value that the debtors have into the
estate." H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 176 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6136.
120. See EPSTEIN, supra note 23, at 165.
121. See id. (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 704, 726 (2006)).
122. See Curry v. Hanna, 228 Ark. 280, 284, 307 S.W.2d 77, 80 (1957). Observe that this
is the second reference to "standing in the shoes" made by this comment. See supra note 74
and accompanying text. No connection is intended, nor does the author intend to take credit
for originality. The author assumes that courts use this particular phrase because it visually
and creatively describes the process of one party's legal rights or duties being derived from
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debtor remains "in possession"-there is no trustee.12 3 The debtor-in-
possession's use of estate property, including any sale of such property un-
der section 363, is subject to the bankruptcy court's supervision.124 Similar-
ly, in Chapter 13, the debtor remains in possession of his bankruptcy estate,
although his use of it is subject to the scrutiny of the bankruptcy judge.125
Additionally, the presence of substantial assets in a debtor's bankruptcy
estate may keep a debtor in Chapter 13 making monthly payments to his
unsecured creditors instead of liquidating under Chapter 7.126 Presumably,
most donees receiving income under a donative trust will be filing under
Chapter 13 because of the 2005 amendments to the bankruptcy code.127
It is notable that section 541 does not require that the debtor actually
receive any property; it is his interest in property that is of concern.128 Be-
cause income distributions under mandatory trusts confer vested, present
economic interests,' 29 they should, and likely will, be included in the bank-
ruptcy estate.13 0 But what about distributions made under a pure discretio-
nary trust or discretionary support trust? To answer this question, considera-
tion of the basic structure of a bankruptcy case is helpful. Therefore, in the
next subsection, this comment examines section 541(c)(2) in light of the
balance between the presumptively inclusive estate, as described above, and
the substantial protections of the automatic stay and discharge as described
below.
B. The Automatic Stay and Discharge
When a voluntary bankruptcy petition is filed, "an automatic stay of
actions against the debtor and against the estate is immediately imposed."' 3 1
The stay gives the debtor a "breathing spell" from his creditors, stops all
collection efforts, and permits a debtor to attempt a reorganization plan.' 32 it
the rights or duties of another.
123. See EPSTEIN, supra note 23, at 165-66. If, however, a "party in interest" moves for
the appointment of a Chapter 11 trustee, the court may consider such a request after notice
and a hearing. Id. at 166; 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (2006). If a trustee is appointed, the debtor will
be "out-of-possession"; as a lesser penalty, a court may appoint an examiner. Id. § 1 104(c).
124. See EPSTEIN, supra note 23, at 166.
125. Id.
126. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2006).
127. See infra note 143.
128. See, e.g., In re Hargis, 887 F.2d 77, 79 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that because the
debtor was not entitled to certain life insurance proceeds at the time of filing her bankruptcy
petition, or within 180 days thereafter, the proceeds were not property of the estate).
129. See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
130. See, e.g., In re Schultz, 324 B.R. 712, 718 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2005).
131. In re Hutchins, 216 B.R. 1, 7 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1997).
132. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2006). See In re Computer Commc'ns, Inc., 824 F.2d 725, 729
(9th Cir. 1987) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 240 (1978)).
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is one of the fundamental debtor protections granted by the bankruptcy
code,13 3 and its provisions are to be broadly construed.134
An equally potent protection for debtors in bankruptcy is discharge.
While a discharge in bankruptcy does not destroy prepetition debts, it does
bar all legal remedies of collection.'3 5 All that remains is a moral obligation
resting on the debtor.' 6 Furthermore, bankruptcy law presumes the debtor
will receive a general discharge at the close of his or her case unless one of
several statutory grounds for denial exists.13 7 But if a particular debtor does
not receive a general discharge, the following discussion of section
541(c)(2) is of little importance because his debts will survive the termina-
tion of his bankruptcy case.
C. Section 541(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code
Section 541(c)(2) provides that "[a] restriction on the transfer of a
beneficial interest of the debtor in a trust that is enforceable under applica-
ble nonbankruptcy law is enforceable in a case under this title.""' Thus, so
long as a spendthrift or anti-alienation provision is valid under state or fed-
eral statutory or common law, the beneficiary's entire interest in that dona-
tive or retirement trust will be excluded from the bankruptcy estate.139
133. In re Univ. Med. Ctr., 973 F.2d 1065, 1074 (3d Cir. 1992).
134. In re Walters, 219 B.R. 520, 525 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1998); see also Delpit v.
Comm'r, 18 F.3d 768, 771 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that the automatic stay "should apply to
almost any type of formal or informal action against the debtor . . . ").
135. See Ark. Baptist State Convention v. Bd. of Trs. of Baptist State Hosp., 209 Ark.
236, 241, 189 S.W.2d 913, 916 (1945). Two chief exceptions to the general rule of dischar-
geability are debt obtained by fraud or defalcation and debt relating to a breach of a fiduciary
duty. See Liebke v. Thomas, 116 U.S. 605, 607-08 (1886) ("It is of the essence of the bank-
rupt law that . . . [the debtor] should be released from all his debts, except those of a fidu-
ciary character or founded in fraud .... ). The exceptions to dischargeability are set forth in
section 523(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. The complete list includes debts relating to taxes and
customs duties; money, property, services, or credit obtained by false pretenses or misrepre-
sentation; fraud or defalcation by a fiduciary; family support obligations; willful or malicious
injury to persons or property; fines, penalties, and forfeitures; student loans; injuries caused
by drunk driving; prior bankruptcies; condominium or cooperative housing association fees;
and violations of securities laws. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (2006).
136. Ark. Baptist State Convention, 209 Ark. at 239, 189 S.W.2d at 915; see also
NORTON, supra note 101 at § 58:1 ("A basic purpose of the bankruptcy system is to provide
debtors with the opportunity for an economic 'fresh start."').
137. 11 U.S.C. §§ 727, 1141, 1328(b) (2006). See, e.g., Zavelo v. Reeves, 227 U.S. 625,
630 (1913); see also In re Brown, 314 F. Supp. 947, 954 (W.D. Ark. 1970), aff'd, 444 F.2d
49 (8th Cir. 1971).
138. 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) (2006).
139. In re Hipple, 225 B.R. 808, 813 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1996) ("[Section] 541(c)(2) limits
[section] 541(a)'s broad sweep and excludes from property of the estate the debtor's interest




While an exclusion is technically different than an exemption under the
code, in that the former prevents property from entry into the estate while
the latter removes property from the estate that was originally included
therein, the ultimate effect as to each class of property is similar.14 0 Regard-
less of whether property is excluded or exempted from the bankruptcy es-
tate, income generated by it may be included in a debtor's projected dispos-
able income calculation and may be used, in part, to pay his or her unse-
cured creditors as part of a Chapter 13 plan; 14 1 discharge, of course, will
shield the rest of the debtor's interest. A 1992 Supreme Court decision-
Patterson v. Shumatel42 -iS the seminal case on section 541(c)(2).
1. Patterson v. Shumate
The material facts of Patterson are as follows: Joseph Shumate was a
longtime employee of Coleman Furniture Corporation (Coleman), where he
ultimately rose to the position of president and chairman of the board.143
140. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) (2006) (excluding debtors' interests in valid spend-
thrift trusts from property of the state) with id. § 522 (exempting certain real and personal
property from the estate). See, e.g., In re Schuster, 256 B.R. 701, 704 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2000)
(excluding annuity because the annuitant had a beneficial interest that was governed by a
restriction on transfer enforceable under state statute).
141. See In re Taylor, 212 F.3d 395, 397 (8th Cir. 2000) ("The fact that a pension is
exempt from the reach of creditors does not preclude a bankruptcy court from finding that
the pension is also disposable income for purposes of Chapter 13."). Chapter 13 bankruptcy
is available for debtors with regular income who wish to avoid liquidating their assets under
Chapter 7. This is accomplished by paying their disposable income to unsecured creditors
over a three- to five-year period under a court-approved plan. In re Washburn, 579 F.3d 934,
936 (8th Cir. 2009). Prior to Congress's enactment of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA), a Chapter 13 debtor's disposable income was
calculated by subtracting his or her actual expenses (computed on "Schedule J") from his or
her actual income (computed on "Schedule 1"). In re Frederickson, 545 F.3d 652, 658 (8th
Cir. 2008). Post-BAPCPA, disposable income (for above-median-income debtors) is calcu-
lated using Official Form 22C which is a line-by-line application of the means test set forth
in sections 707(b)(2) and 1325(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code. Id. The means test uses certain
local and national standards from the Treasury Department in lieu of a debtor's actual ex-
penses and deducts those amounts from his or her "current monthly income," which is the
average of the prior six months "income from all sources" received by the debtor, in lieu of
his or her actual income. Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2)). Line six of Form 22C includes
"pension and retirement income" in the disposable income calculation despite the fact that
such a plan would likely be excluded from the estate under section 541(c)(2), which is in
accord with pre-BAPCPA law. See In re Baker, 194 B.R. 881, 885 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1996)
(holding income generated by insurance proceeds-an exempt asset-was properly included
in disposable income because it constituted an "anticipated stream of payments"). Line nine
of Form 22C includes "income from all other sources." Thus, net income paid from a dona-
tive trust is similarly included in a debtor's disposable income, regardless of whether it is
excluded from the estate via section 541(c)(2).
142. 504 U.S. 753 (1992).
143. Id. at 755.
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Shumate, along with the rest of the company's four hundred employees, was
a participant in a defined-benefit plan that qualified as a pension plan under
section 206(d)(1) of ERISA.'" In 1982, Coleman, which was experiencing
financial difficulties, filed for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code.14 5 Its case was subsequently converted to a Chapter 7
proceeding and the court appointed a bankruptcy trustee.14 6 Shortly thereaf-
ter, Shumate filed an individual bankruptcy petition and his case was also
converted.147
The trustee in Coleman's bankruptcy terminated and liquidated the
company's pension plan, providing full distributions to all participants ex-
cept Shumate. 14 8 Shumate's bankruptcy trustee then filed an adversary pro-
ceeding against Coleman's trustee to recover Shumate's interest in his
pension for the benefit of his bankruptcy estate.14 9 The adversary proceed-
ing was merged into a related proceeding in a West Virginia federal district
court.150 That court, applying only Virginia law, held that Shumate's interest
in his pension did not qualify for protection as a spendthrift trust.
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court,
holding that ERISA-qualified pension plans, which by definition have anti-
alienation provisions, contain enforceable restrictions on the transfer of
pension interests. 152 It held that Shumate's interest in his pension should be
excluded from the bankruptcy estate under section 541(c)(2).'53 The Su-
preme Court then granted certiorari to resolve the circuit split on whether
anti-alienation provisions in ERISA-qualified benefit plans constitute enfor-
144. Id. This section is codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1056 (d)(1) (2006). See supra note 60-64
and accompanying text.




149. Id. at 756.
150. Id.
151. Patterson, 504 U.S. at 756. Ultimately the meaning of the phrase "applicable non-
bankruptcy law" was clarified by the Supreme Court's decision in Patterson. The Court held
that such law includes both state and federal law. Id. at 759. Prior to that decision, however,
the opposing viewpoint-that the phrase meant only state law-was widely held. Id. at 756-
57. That was the view of the district court when it held Shumate's pension plan did not satis-
fy section 541(c)(2)'s requirement of enforceability. See Creasy v. Coleman Furniture Corp.,
83 B.R. 404, 408-09 (W.D. Va. 1988). The applicable law was that of Virginia (Shumate
was a resident of Virginia and Coleman was a Virginia corporation). Id. at 405. In Virginia, a
spendthrift trust is unenforceable if the beneficiary possesses too much control over it. See id.
at 407-08; see also supra text accompanying note 39 (describing the control test generally).
The district court found that Shumate had too much control over his pension benefits and
therefore the anti-alienation clause therein was unenforceable under Virginia law. Creasy, 83
B.R. at 408.




ceable restrictions on transfer under "applicable nonbankruptcy law" for
purposes of the section 541(c)(2) exclusion of property from the debtor's
bankruptcy estate.154
A unanimous Court held that Shumate's interest his ERISA-qualified
pension plan should be excluded from the property of his bankruptcy es-
tate.'5 The Court's decision was based on section 541(c)(2) of the bank-
ruptcy code and the aforementioned ERISA statutes and regulations. 156 As
to section 541(c)(2) itself, the Court upheld the Fourth Circuit's view that
"applicable nonbankruptcy law" includes federal and state statutory and
common law.157 Citing the federal courts' construction of the ERISA sta-
tutes and regulations in play, the Court found that Shumate's interest in his
pension plan was unassignable, even once paid out to him.'" 8 In other
words, the restriction on transfer in Shumate's pension plan was enforceable
under nonbankruptcy law. Therefore, it held that section 541(c)(2) required
that the plan be excluded from Shumate's bankruptcy estate.
2. Happenstance ofBankruptcy
Toward the end of his opinion in Patterson, Justice Blackmun made
the following statement: "[T]he treatment of pension benefits will not vary
based on the beneficiary's bankruptcy status."159 He continued by recogniz-
ing that "' [u]niform treatment of property interests' prevents 'a party from
receiving a windfall merely by reason of the happenstance of bankrupt-
cy."'l60 For Justice Blackmun, the recapitulation of the happenstance rule
was more than mere dictum because it provided rationale for his ultimate
disposition: The Court's holding gave the anti-alienation provision in Shu-
154. Id.
155. Id. at 765.
156. Id. at 757 ("In our view, the plain language of the Bankruptcy Code and ERISA is
our determinant."). For clarity, the statute was 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (2006) and the regula-
tion was 26 C.F.R. § 1.401(a)-13(b)(1).
157. Patterson, 504 U.S. at 758.
158. Id. at 760.
159. Id. at 764.
160. Id. (quoting Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979)). The following excerpt
from Butner explains the rationale behind the happenstance rule:
Property interests are created and defined by state law. Unless some federal in-
terest requires a different result, there is no reason why such interests should be
analyzed differently simply because an interested party is involved in a bank-
ruptcy proceeding. Uniform treatment of property interests by both state and
federal courts within a State serves to reduce uncertainty, to discourage forum
shopping, and to prevent a party from receiving 'a windfall merely by reason of
the happenstance of bankruptcy.'




mate's pension plan the same effect inside of bankruptcy as it would have
had outside of bankruptcy. Thus, it would not be fair to say that Shumate
received a "windfall merely by the reason of the happenstance of bankrupt-
cy."
This comment, however, suggests that the happenstance rule is often
frustrated by the overinclusive nature of section 541(c)(2). Specifically,
when a beneficiary's future interest in income distributions arising out of a
spendthrift donative trust is excluded from the bankruptcy estate, the hap-
penstance rule is instantly violated. In most cases,' 6 1 outside of bankruptcy,
the beneficiary's interest in such a trust could, in fact, be reached by his
creditors-either while in the hands of the trustee or once paid out to him.
Yet "by the happenstance of bankruptcy" his interest will be transformed:
inside of bankruptcy (when section 541(c)(2) excludes this interest from the
estate) the beneficiary takes all future streams of income free and clear of
his prepetition debts following discharge. Thus, creditors have full access to
trust income outside of bankruptcy but-because of section 541(c)(2)-
extremely limited access inside of it. Clearly "uniform property interests"
have not been maintained, and the debtor has most certainly received a
"windfall."
The next two sections of this comment will demonstrate this problem
by applying the law as expressed in sections two through four to the test-
suites from the introduction and will suggest a possible modification to sec-
tion 541(c)(2).
V. APPLICATION
As we saw in Patterson, section 541(c)(2) can produce a fair outcome
when applied to retirement trusts. Joseph Shumate's pension received the
same treatment inside of bankruptcy (exclusion from estate) as it would
have received outside of it (exempt from execution). Thus the happenstance
rule was satisfied. This section revisits the three test-suites from the intro-
duction to prove that section 541(c)(2) does not always produce such a fair
outcome-particularly when donative trusts are involved.
A. Maria: The Moderate-Income Widow Receiving Discretionary Support
Distributions Under a Donative Testamentary Trust
Outside of bankruptcy, Maria's interest is likely invulnerable to credi-
tor action. Because her husband Tony hired a shrewd trusts attorney who
layered absolute discretion on top of a support trust, her trustee is under no
duty to make regular payments. In fact, the trustee can use the income gen-
161. A discretionary support trust is an important exception here. See supra Part III.
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crated by the discretionary support trust to provide for all of her necessities
by paying them on her behalf. Thus, Maria has no present enforceable inter-
est in any part of the net income generated by the trust and, by the "shoes"
rule,162 therefore, neither do any of her creditors. Inside of bankruptcy, the
result is not much different. Section 541(c)(2) will exclude Maria's interest
in the trust from the bankruptcy estate because the spendthrift provision is
enforceable under nonbankruptcy law. Therefore, assuming Maria receives
a discharge, she will receive the trust benefits so long as she lives, and her
prepetition creditors will receive no part of them. As it did for Joseph Shu-
mate in Patterson, section 541(c)(2) provides an equitable outcome here
because "uniform treatment of property interests" inside and outside of
bankruptcy was achieved. Furthermore, Maria's right to continue receiving
moderate streams of income following the close of her bankruptcy case
comports with the policies supporting section 541(c)(2).
B. Doris: The Wealthy Divorcde Receiving Mandatory Quarterly Distri-
butions from a Property Settlement
Outside of bankruptcy, Doris's interest is extremely vulnerable. Even
though the trust's spendthrift provision is valid, it would not protect the
income post-distribution-her creditors could execute upon it the moment it
is paid. Ultimately, one hundred percent of her interest would be available
to creditors. Inside of bankruptcy, however, because the trust's spendthrift
clause is enforceable under state law, Doris's entire interest in it is excluded
from the bankruptcy estate.' 63 Following discharge, she will continue to
receive and enjoy all future distributions free and clear for as long as she
lives, while her creditors receive nothing. Thus, it appears that Doris has
"received a windfall merely by the happenstance of bankruptcy." That Doris
will continue to receive income from the trust, free and clear of her credi-
tors, is an egregious and unintended consequence of section 541(c)(2), es-
pecially considering her substantial wealth and the circumstances under
which she filed for bankruptcy.
162. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
163. Doris will have to remain in Chapter 13 and at least part of the trust income will be
distributed pro-rata to her unsecured creditors as part of her plan, see supra note 141, be-
cause her creditors would receive more via distributions made under a Chapter 13 plan than
in a Chapter 7 liquidation. See Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, _ U.S.
, -, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1336 (2010) (citing II U.S.C. § 707(b) (2006)). So, while Doris's
unsecured creditors will receive something, the amount is nominal compared to what they




C. Freddy: The Derelict Adult Child Receiving the Benefit of a Support
Trust
Outside of bankruptcy, Freddy's interest is at least partly vulnerable
because, although the trust is mostly discretionary and, therefore, confers
upon him only a contingent future interest, the "comfortable support and
maintenance" language therein likely provides an "ascertainable standard"
by which he could compel some distributions if none were forthcoming.
Because Freddy's standard of living is unusually "comfortable," these dis-
tributions could be sizeable. Thus, his creditors could stand in Freddy's
shoes and obtain at least some recovery from his trust fund. Inside of bank-
ruptcy, however, section 541(c)(2) will exclude Freddy's entire interest in
the trust. So, even the portion that is unassignable under state law, will now
be forever inalienable following his bankruptcy. Surely, allowing dynastic
wealth to pass through a bankruptcy case was not within Congress's aims
when it drafted section 541(c)(2).'6
VI. PROPOSAL TO HARMONIZE 541(c)(2) WITH THE HAPPENSTANCE RULE
Congress should limit the scope of section 541(c)(2) to retirement in-
come and payments from discretionary support trusts only. Income from
mandatory donative trusts-whether governed by a valid spendthrift provi-
sion or not-should be included in the bankruptcy estate. The following
illustrations will demonstrate how this modification would align section
541(c)(2) with the happenstance rule, whereas, if the property interest re-
mains the same both inside and outside of bankruptcy, the happenstance
rule is satisfied. The first subsection will set forth the current language of
section 541(c)(2) and show how it violates the happenstance rule when ap-
plied to income from mandatory and discretionary trusts. The second sub-
section will propose a slight modification to section 541(c)(2) that will satis-
fy the happenstance rule in all cases. Accordingly, the sections will employ
the following standardized descriptions-"full access", "limited access", or
"no access"-indicating the degree of access that the beneficiary's creditors
have to the income flowing from each trust.
164. To the contrary, the legislative history of section 541 (c)(2) suggests that the exclu-
sion should provide only limited financial support: "Paragraph (2) of subsection (c), howev-
er, preserves restrictions on a transfer of a spendthrift trust . . . to the extent of the income
reasonably necessary for the support of a debtor and his dependents." S. REP. No. 95-989, pt.
2, at 83 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5869.
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A. Current Section 541(c)(2)
The following is the current language of section 541(c)(2):
A restriction on the transfer of a beneficial interest of the debtor in a
trust that is enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law is enforce-
able in a case under this title.
As already noted, income from retirement trusts and discretionary sup-
port trusts is not transmuted by section 541(c)(2); each trust affords credi-
tors no access to the income both inside and outside of bankruptcy. Creditor
access to income from mandatory and pure discretionary trusts, however, is
dramatically affected by section 541(c)(2). The following illustrations seek
to explain this process.
1. Happenstance Rule Satisfied in Certain Cases
ERISA-qualified Retirement Trust Income
Outside of Bankruptcy Inside of Bankruptcy
No access: No access:
Creditors have no right to the in- The beneficiary's entire interest is
come while held in the plan and can- excluded from the bankruptcy estate
not execute on it once paid out be- and creditors may not pursue any legal
cause of state-law exemptions. or equitable process because of the
automatic stay and eventual discharge.
Discretionary Support Income from Donative Trust with Valid
Spendthrift Provision
Outside of Bankruptcy Inside of Bankruptcy
No access: No access:
Creditors have no right to the in- The beneficiary's entire interest is
come while held in trust because the excluded from the bankruptcy estate
beneficiary has no present enforceable and creditors may not pursue any legal
interest in it. Furthermore, they cannot or equitable process because of the
execute on income applied on behalf automatic stay and eventual discharge.
of the beneficiary because he or she
never actually receives it.
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2. Happenstance Rule Violated in Certain Cases
Mandatory Income from Donative Trust with Valid Spendthrift
Provision
Outside of Bankruptcy Inside of Bankruptcy
Full access: No access:
Creditors can compel overdue or The beneficiary's entire interest is
withheld distributions while held in excluded from the bankruptcy estate
trust and can execute on income once and creditors may not pursue any legal
paid out to the beneficiary. or equitable process because of the
automatic stay and eventual discharge.
Discretionary Income from Donative Trust with Valid Spendthrift
Provision
Outside of Bankruptcy Inside of Bankruptcy
Limited access: No access:
Creditors have no right to assets The beneficiary's entire interest is
while held in trust but may execute on excluded from the bankruptcy estate
income once paid out to the benefi- and creditors may not pursue any legal
ciary. or equitable process because of the
automatic stay and eventual discharge.
B. Proposed Section 541(c)(2)
This comment proposes that Congress amend section 541(c)(2) so that
it reads as follows:
A restriction on the transfer of a beneficial interest of the debtor in a re-
tirement or discretionary support trust that is enforceable under applica-
ble nonbankruptcy law is enforceable in a case under this title.
With this proposed revision, section 541(c)(2) satisfies the happens-
tance rule, because whatever access creditors have to the income prior to
bankruptcy remains in effect after the bankruptcy. The sole exception con-
cerns mandatory trusts. Outside of bankruptcy, creditors enjoy nearly full
access to all required distributions. Under the current section 541(c)(2),
creditors have no access whatsoever. Under the proposed revision to section
541(c)(2), however, creditors would have a significantly higher degree of
access, though not entirely full access-an outcome substantially in com-
pliance with the happenstance rule.
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ERISA-qualified Retirement Trust Income
Outside of Bankruptcy Inside of Bankruptcy
No access: No access:
Creditors have no right to the in- The beneficiary's entire interest is
come while held in the plan per excluded from the bankruptcy estate
ERISA's anti-alienation requirement and creditors may not pursue any legal
and can't execute on it once paid out or equitable process because of the
because of state-law exemptions. automatic stay and eventual discharge.
Discretionary Support Income from Donative Trust with Valid
Spendthrift Provision
Outside of Bankruptcy Inside of Bankruptcy
No access: No access:
Creditors have no right to the in- The beneficiary's entire interest is
come while held in trust because the excluded from the bankruptcy estate
beneficiary has no present enforceable and creditors may not pursue any legal
interest in it and cannot execute on or equitable process because of the
income applied on behalf of the bene- automatic stay and eventual discharge.
ficiary because he or she never actual-
ly receives it.
Mandatory Income from Donative Trust with Valid Spendthrift
Provision
Outside of Bankruptcy Inside of Bankruptcy
Full access: Limited Access:
Creditors can compel overdue or The beneficiary's entire interest is
withheld distributions while held in included in the bankruptcy estate and
trust and can execute on income once creditors will receive whatever is pro-
paid out to the beneficiary. vided to them in the plan or via liqui-
dation.
Discretionary Income from Donative Trust with Valid Spendthrift
Provision
Outside of Bankruptcy Inside of Bankruptcy
Limited access: Limited access:
Creditors have no right to assets The beneficiary's entire interest is
while held in trust but may execute on included in the bankruptcy estate and
income once paid out to the benefi- creditors will receive whatever is pro-




In conclusion, the current operation of section 541(c)(2) flies in the
face of Congressional intent and is not supported by any rational public
policy. The current version of the statute is overinclusive and creates a loo-
phole through which dynastic wealth can squeeze through bankruptcy. Most
importantly, it violates the happenstance rule-a venerable doctrine of the
Supreme Court of the United States. It must be narrowed to include only
retirement income and payments made on behalf of the beneficiary under a
discretionary support trust. In the meantime, trust and estate practitioners
wishing to shelter a beneficiary's income interest from creditors would be
wise to employ a discretionary support trust governed by a spendthrift pro-
vision. These trusts provide the trustee with maximum flexibility to provide
for the beneficiary while avoiding passing the trust assets to his or her credi-
tors, both inside and outside of bankruptcy.
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